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Abstract
In peer-to-peer systems, attrition attacks include both
traditional, network-level denial of service attacks as
well as application-level attacks in which malign peers
conspire to waste loyal peers’ resources. We describe
several defenses for LOCKSS, a peer-to-peer digital
preservation system, that help ensure that application-
level attacks even from powerful adversaries are less
effective than simple network-level attacks, and that
network-level attacks must be intense, wide-spread, and
prolonged to impair the system. $Revision: 1.317 $
1 Introduction
Denial of Service (DoS) attacks are among the most dif-
ficult for distributed systems to resist. Distinguishing le-
gitimate requests for service from the attacker’s requests
can be tricky, and devoting substantial effort to doing
so can easily be self-defeating. The term DoS was in-
troduced by Needham [32] with a broad meaning but
over time it has come to mean high-bit-rate network-level
flooding attacks [22] that rapidly degrade the usefulness
of the victim system. In addition to DoS, we use the
term attrition to include also moderate- or low-bit-rate
application-level attacks that gradually impair the victim
system.
The mechanisms described in this paper are aimed
at equipping the LOCKSS1 peer-to-peer (P2P) digital
preservation system to resist attrition attacks. The sys-
tem is in use at about 80 libraries worldwide; publishers
of about 2000 titles have endorsed its use. Cooperation
among peers reduces the cost and increases the reliabil-
ity of preservation, eliminates the need for backup, and
greatly reduces other operator interventions.
A loyal (non-malign) peer participates in the LOCKSS
system for two reasons: to achieve regular reassurance
1LOCKSS is a trademark of Stanford University. It stands for “Lots
Of Copies Keep Stuff Safe.”
that its content agrees with the consensus of the peers
holding copies of the same content, and if it does not,
to obtain the needed repair. The goal of an attrition ad-
versary is to prevent loyal peers from successfully de-
termining the consensus of their peers or from obtain-
ing requested repairs for so long that undetected storage
problems such as natural “bit rot” or human error cor-
rupt their content. Other types of resource waste may be
inconvenient but have no lasting effect on this system.
We have developed a set of defenses, some adapted
from other systems, whose combination in a P2P context
provides novel and effective protection against attrition.
These defenses include admission control, desynchro-
nization, and redundancy. Admission control, effected
via rate limitation, first-hand reputation, and effort bal-
ancing, ensures that legitimate requests can be serviced
even during malicious request floods. Desynchronization
ensures that progress continues even if some suppliers of
a needed service are currently too busy. Redundancy en-
sures that the attacker cannot incapacitate the system by
targeting only few peers at a time.
In prior work [29] we used redundancy and rate lim-
itation to defend LOCKSS peers against attacks seeking
to corrupt their content. That system, however, remained
vulnerable to application-level attrition; about 50 malign
peers could abuse the protocol to prevent a network of
1000 peers from auditing and repairing its content.
This paper presents a new design of the LOCKSS pro-
tocol that makes four contributions. First, we demon-
strate how our new design ensures that application-level
attrition, no matter how powerful the attacker, is less ef-
fective than simple network flooding. We do this while
retaining our previous resistance against other adver-
saries. Second, we show that even network-level attacks
that continuously prevent all communication among a
majority of the peers must last for months to affect the
system significantly. Such attacks are many orders of
magnitude more powerful than those observed in prac-
tice [31]. Third, since resource management lies at the
Draft - Do not redistribute 2
crux of attrition attacks and their defenses, we extend
our prior evaluation [29] to deal with numerous con-
currently preserved archival units of content competing
with each other for resources. Finally, resource over-
provisioning is essential in defending against attrition
attacks. Our contribution is the ability to put an upper
bound on the amount of over-provisioning required to
defend the LOCKSS system from an arbitrarily power-
ful attrition adversary. Our defenses may not all be im-
mediately applicable to all P2P applications, but we be-
lieve that many systems may benefit from a subset of de-
fenses, and that our analysis of the effectiveness of these
defenses is more broadly useful.
In the rest of this paper, we first describe our applica-
tion. We continue by outlining how we would like this
application to behave under different levels of attrition
attack. We give an overview of the LOCKSS protocol,
describing how it incorporates each of our attrition de-
fenses. We then explain the results of a systematic explo-
ration of simulated attacks against the resulting design,
showing that it successfully defends against attrition at-
tacks at all layers, from the network level up through the
application protocol.
2 The Application
In this section, we provide an overview of the digital
preservation problem for academic publishing, the prob-
lem that LOCKSS seeks to solve. We then present and
justify the set of design goals required of any solution to
this problem, setting the stage for our approach in subse-
quent sections.
Academic publishing has migrated to the Web [42],
placing society’s scientific and cultural heritage at a vari-
ety of risks such as confused provenance, accidental edit-
ing by the publisher, storage corruption, failed backups,
government or corporate censorship, vandalism, and de-
liberate rewriting of history. The LOCKSS system was
designed [36] to provide librarians with the tools they
need to preserve their community’s access to journals
and other Web materials.
Any solution must meet six stringent requirements.
First, since under US law [16] copyright Web content can
only be preserved with the owner’s permission, the so-
lution must accommodate the publishers’ interests. Re-
quiring publishers, for example, to offer perpetual no-
fee access or digital signatures on content makes them
reluctant to give that permission. Second, a solution
must be extremely cheap in terms of hardware, operating
cost, and human expertise. Few libraries could afford [3]
a solution involving handling and securely storing off-
line media, but most can afford the few cheap off-the-
shelf PCs that provide sufficient storage for tens of thou-
sands of journal-years. Third, the existence of cheap,
reliable storage cannot be assumed; affordable storage
is unreliable [21, 35]. Fourth, a solution must have a
long time horizon. Auditing content against stored dig-
ital signatures, for example, assumes not only that the
cryptosystem will remain unbroken, but also that the se-
crecy, integrity, and availability of the keys are guaran-
teed for decades. Fifth, a solution must anticipate ad-
versaries capable of powerful attacks sustained over long
periods; it must withstand these attacks, or at least de-
grade slowly and gracefully while providing unambigu-
ous warnings [34]. Sixth, a solution must not require a
central locus of control or administration, if it is to with-
stand concentrated technical or legal attacks.
Two different architectures have been proposed for
preserving Web journals. On one hand, trusted third
party archives require publishers to grant the archive per-
mission, under certain circumstances, to republish their
content. It has proved very difficult to persuade pub-
lishers to do so [5]. In the LOCKSS system, on the
other hand, publishers need only grant their subscribing
libraries permission to supply their own content replica
to their local readers. This has been the key to obtaining
permission from publishers. It is thus important to note
that our goal is not to minimize the number of replicas
consistent with content safety. Instead, we strive to min-
imize the per-replica cost of maintaining a large number
of replicas. We trade extra replicas for fewer lawyers, an
easy decision given their relative costs.
The LOCKSS design is extremely conservative, mak-
ing few assumptions about the infrastructure. Although
we believe this is appropriate for a digital preservation
system, less conservative assumptions are certainly pos-
sible. Taking increased risk can increase the amount
of content that can be preserved with given computa-
tional power. For example, the availability of limited
amounts of reliable, write-once memory would allow au-
dits against local hashes, the availability of a reliable
public key infrastructure might allow publishers to sign
their content and peers to audit against the signatures,
and so on. Conservatively, the assumptions underlying
such optimizations could be violated without warning at
any time; the write-once memory might be corrupted or
mishandled or a private key might leak. Thus, designs us-
ing these optimizations would still need the audit mech-
anism as a fall-back. The more a peer operator can do to
avoid local failures the better the system works, but our
conservative design principles lead us to focus on mech-
anisms that minimize dependence on these efforts.
With this specific application in mind, we tackle the
“abstract” problem of auditing and repairing replicas of
distinct archival units or AUs (a year’s run of an on-line
journal, in our target application) preserved by a popu-
lation of peers (libraries) in the face of attrition attacks.
For each AU it preserves, a peer starts out with its own,
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correct replica (obtained from the publisher’s Web site),
which it can only use to satisfy local read requests (from
local patrons) and to assist other peers with replica re-
pairs. In the rest of this paper we refer to AUs, peers,
and replicas, rather than journals and libraries.
3 System Model
In this section we present the adversary we model, our
security goals for the system, and our defensive frame-
work.
3.1 Adversary Model
In keeping with our conservative design philosophy, we
assume a powerful adversary with several important abil-
ities. Pipe stoppage is his ability to prevent communi-
cation with victim peers for extended periods by flood-
ing links with garbage packets or using more sophisti-
cated techniques [25]. Total information awareness al-
lows him to control and monitor all of his resources in-
stantaneously. He has unconstrained identities in that he
can purchase or spoof unlimited network identities. In-
sider information allows him complete knowledge of his
victims’ system parameters and resource commitments.
Masquerading means that loyal peers cannot detect him,
as long as he follows the protocol. Finally, he has unlim-
ited computational resources, though he is polynomially
bounded in his computations (i.e., he cannot invert cryp-
tographic functions).
The adversary employs these capabilities in effortless
and effortful attacks. An effortless attack requires no
measurable computational effort from the attacker and
includes traditional DoS attacks such as pipe stoppage.
An effortful attack requires the attacker to invest in the
system and therefore requires computational effort.
3.2 Security Goals
The overall goal of the LOCKSS system is to maintain a
high probability that the consensus of peers reflects the
correct AU, and a high probability that a reader accesses
good data. In contrast, an attrition adversary’s goal is to
decrease these probabilities significantly by preventing
peers from auditing their replicas for a long time, long
enough for undetected storage problems such as “bit rot”
to occur.
Severe pipe stoppage attacks in the wild last for days
or weeks [31]. Our goal is to ensure that, in the very
least, the LOCKSS system withstands such attacks sus-
tained over months. Beyond pipe stoppage, attackers
must use protocol messages to some extent. We seek to
ensure the following three conditions. First, a peer man-
ages its resources so as to prevent exhaustion no matter
how much effort is exerted by however many identities
request service. Second, when deciding which requests
to service, a peer gives preference to requests from those
likely to behave properly (i.e., “ostensibly legitimate”).
And third, at every stage of a protocol exchange, an os-
tensibly legitimate attacker expends commensurate effort
to that which he imposes upon the defenders.
3.3 Defensive Framework
We seek to curb the adversary’s success by modeling
a peer’s processing of inbound messages as a series of
filters, each costing a certain amount to apply. A mes-
sage rejected by a filter has no further effect on the peer,
allowing us to estimate the cost of eliminating whole
classes of messages from further consideration. Each fil-
ter increases the effort a victim needs to defend itself, but
limits the effectiveness of some adversary capability.
The bandwidth filter models a peer’s network connec-
tion. It represents the physical limits on the rates of
inbound messages that an adversary can force upon his
victims. The admission control filter takes inbound mes-
sages at the maximum rate supported by the bandwidth
filter and further limits them to match the maximum rate
at which a peer expects protocol traffic from legitimate
senders, favoring known peer identities. This curbs the
adversary’s use of unlimited identities and prevents him
from applying potentially unconstrained computational
resources upon a victim. The effort balancing filters en-
sure that effort imposed upon a victim by ostensibly le-
gitimate traffic is balanced by correspondingly high ef-
fort borne by the attacker, making it costly for a resource-
constrained adversary to masquerade as a legitimate peer.
We show in Section 7.4 that the most effective strat-
egy for effortful attacks is to emulate legitimacy, and that
even this has minimal effect on the utility of the system.
Effortless attacks, such as traditional distributed DoS
(DDoS) attacks, are more effective but must be main-
tained for a long time against most of the peer population
to degrade the system significantly (Section 7.2).
4 The LOCKSS Replica Auditing and Re-
pair Protocol
The LOCKSS audit process operates as a sequence of
“opinion polls” conducted by every peer on each of its
AU replicas. At intervals, typically every 3 months, a
peer (the poller) constructs a random subset (i.e., sam-
ple) of the peer population that it knows are preserv-
ing an AU, and invites those peers as voters into a poll.
Each voter individually hashes a poller-supplied nonce
and its replica of the AU to produce a fresh vote, which
the poller tallies. If the poller is outvoted in a landslide
(e.g., it disagrees with 80% of the votes), it assumes its
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Figure 1: A time-line of a poll, showing the message
exchange between the poller and a voter.
replica is corrupt and repairs it from a disagreeing voter.
The roles of poller and voter are distinct, but every peer
plays both.
The general structure of a poll follows the time-line of
Figure 1. A poll consists of two phases: the vote solici-
tation phase and the evaluation phase. In the vote solic-
itation phase the poller requests and obtains votes from
as many voters in its sample of the population as pos-
sible. Then the poller begins the evaluation phase, dur-
ing which it compares these votes to its own replica, one
hashed content block at a time, and tallies them. If the
hashes disagree the poller may request repair blocks from
its voters and re-evaluate the block. If in the eventual
tally, after any repairs, the poller agrees with the land-
slide majority, it sends a receipt to each of its voters and
immediately starts a new poll. Peers interleave making
progress on their own polls and voting in other peers’
polls, spreading each poll over a long period chosen so
that polls on a given AU occur at a rate much higher than
the rate of undetected storage problems, e.g. “bit rot.”
4.1 Vote Solicitation
The outcome of a poll is determined by the votes of the
inner circle peers, sampled at the start of the poll by the
poller from its reference list for the AU. The reference
list contains mostly peers that have agreed with the poller
in recent polls on the AU, and a few peers from its static
friends list, maintained by the poller’s operator.
A poll is considered successful if its result is based
on a minimum number of inner circle votes, the quorum,
which is typically 10, but may change according to the
application’s needs for fault tolerance. To ensure that
a poll is likely to succeed, a poller invites into its poll
a larger inner circle than the quorum (typically, twice as
large). If at first try, an inner circle peer fails to respond to
an invitation, or refuses it, the poller contacts a different
inner circle voter, re-trying the reluctant peer later in the
same vote solicitation phase.
An individual vote solicitation consists of four mes-
sages (see Figure 1): Poll, PollAck, PollProof, and Vote.
For the duration of a poll, a poller establishes an en-
crypted TLS session with each voter individually, via an
anonymous Diffie-Hellman key exchange. Every proto-
col message is conveyed over this TLS session, either
keeping the same TCP connection from message to mes-
sage, or resuming the TLS session over a new one.
The Poll message invites a voter to participate in a poll
on an AU. The invited peer responds with a PollAck mes-
sage, indicating either a refusal to participate in the poll
at the time, or an acceptance of the invitation, if it can
compute a vote within a predetermined time allowance.
The voter commits and reserves local resources to that
effect. The PollProof message supplies the voter with a
random nonce to be used during vote construction. To
compute its vote, the voter uses a cryptographic hash
function (e.g., SHA-1) to hash the nonce supplied by the
poller, followed by its replica of the AU, block by block.
The vote consists of the running hashes produced at each
block boundary. Finally, the voter sends its vote back to
the poller in a Vote message.
These messages also contain proofs of computational
effort, such as those introduced by Dwork et al. [15],
sufficient to ensure that, at every protocol stage, the re-
quester of a service has more invested in the exchange
than the supplier of the service (see Section 5.1).
4.2 Peer Discovery
The poller uses the vote solicitation phase of a poll not
only to obtain votes for the current poll, but also to dis-
cover new peers for its reference list from which it can
solicit inner circle votes in future polls.
Discovery is effected via nominations included in Vote
messages. A voter picks a random subset of its cur-
rent reference list, which it includes in the Vote message.
The poller accumulates these nominations. When it con-
cludes its inner circle solicitations, it chooses a random
sample of these nominations as its outer circle. It pro-
ceeds to solicit regular votes from these outer circle peers
in a manner identical to that used for inner circle peers.
The purpose of the votes obtained from outer circle
voters is to show the “good behavior” of newly discov-
ered peers. Those who perform correctly, by supplying
votes that agree with the prevailing outcome of the poll,
are added into the poller’s reference list at the conclu-
sion of the poll; the outcome of the poll is computed only
from inner-circle votes.
4.3 Vote Evaluation
Once the poller has accumulated all votes it could obtain
from inner and outer circle voters, it begins the poll’s
evaluation phase. During this phase, the poller computes,
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in parallel, all block hashes that each voter should have
computed, if that voter’s replica agreed with the poller’s.
A vote agrees with the poller on a block if the hash in the
vote and that computed by the poller are the same.
For each hash computed by the poller for an AU block,
there are three possibilities: first, the landslide majority
of inner-circle votes (e.g., 80%) agree with the poller; in
this case, the poller considers the audit successful up to
this block and proceeds with the next block. Second, the
landslide majority of inner-circle votes disagree with the
poller; in this case, the poller regards its own replica of
the AU as damaged, obtains a repair from one of the dis-
agreeing voters (via the RepairRequest and Repair mes-
sages), and reevaluates the block hoping to find itself in
the landslide majority, as above. Third, if there is no
landslide majority of agreeing or disagreeing votes, the
poller deems the poll inconclusive, raising an alarm that
requires attention from a human operator.
Throughout the evaluation phase, the poller may also
decide to obtain a repair from a random voter, even if
one is not required (i.e., even if the corresponding block
met with a landslide agreement). The purpose of such
frivolous repairs is to prevent targeted free-riding via the
refusal of repairs; voters are expected to supply a small
number of repairs once they commit to participate in a
poll, and are penalized otherwise (Section 5.1).
If the poller hashes all AU blocks without raising an
alarm, it concludes the poll by sending an evaluation re-
ceipt to each voter (with an EvaluationReceipt message),
indicating that it will not be requesting any more repairs.
The poller then updates its reference list by removing all
voters whose votes determined the poll outcome and by
inserting all agreeing outer-circle voters and some peers
from the friends list (for details see [29]). The poller then
restarts a poll on the same AU, scheduling it to conclude
an inter-poll interval into the future.
5 LOCKSS Defenses
Here we outline the attrition defenses of the LOCKSS
protocol: admission control, desynchronization, and re-
dundancy. These defenses raise system costs for both
loyal peers and attackers, but favor ostensible legiti-
macy. Given a constant amount of over-provisioning,
loyal peers continue to operate at the necessary rate re-
gardless of the attacker’s power. Many systems over-
provision resources to protect performance from known
worst-case behavior (e.g., the Unix file system [30]).
5.1 Admission Control
The purpose of the admission control defense is to ensure
that a peer can control the rate at which it considers poll
invitations from others, favoring invitations from those
who operate at roughly the same rate as itself and pe-
nalizing others. We implement admission control using
three mechanisms: rate limitation, first-hand reputation,
and effort balancing.
Rate Limitation: Without limits on the rate at which
they attempt to service requests, peers can be over-
whelmed by floods of ostensibly valid requests. Rate
Limitation suggests that peers should initiate and sat-
isfy requests no faster than necessary rather than as
fast as possible. Because readers access only their lo-
cal LOCKSS peer, the audit and repair protocol is not
subject to end-users’ unpredictable request patterns. The
protocol can proceed at its own pace, providing an inter-
esting test case for rate limitation.
We identify three possible attacks based on deviation
from the necessary rate of polling. A poll rate adversary
would seek to trick victims into either decreasing (e.g.,
by causing back-off behavior) or increasing (e.g., in an
attempt to recover from a failed poll) their rate of calling
polls. A poll flood adversary would seek, under a multi-
tude of identities, to invite victims into as many frivolous
polls as possible hoping to crowd out the legitimate poll
requests and thereby reduce the ability of loyal peers to
audit and repair their content. A vote flood adversary
would seek to supply as many bogus votes as possible
hoping to exhaust loyal pollers’ resources in useless but
expensive proofs of invalidity.
Peers defend against all these adversaries by setting
their rate limits autonomously, not varying them in re-
sponse to other peers’ actions. Responding to adversity
(inquorate polls or perceived contention) by calling polls
more frequently could aggravate the problem; backing
off to a lower rate of polls would achieve the adversary’s
aim of slowing the detection and repair of damage; Kuz-
manovic et al. [25] describe a similar attack in the context
of TCP retransmission timers. Because peers do not re-
act, the poll rate adversary has no opportunity to attack.
The price of this fixed rate of operation is that, absent
manual intervention, a peer may take several inter-poll
intervals to recover from a catastrophic storage failure.
The poll flood adversary tries to get victims to over-
commit their resources or at least to commit excessively
to the adversary. To prevent over-commitment, peers
maintain a task schedule of their promises to perform ef-
fort, both to generate votes for others and to call their
own polls. If the effort of computing the vote solicited
by an incoming Poll message cannot be accommodated
in the schedule, the invitation is refused. Furthermore,
peers limit the rate at which they even consider poll invi-
tations (i.e., establishing a secure session, checking their
schedule, etc.). A peer sets this rate limit for considering
poll invitations according to the rate of poll invitations
it sends out to others; this is essentially a self-clocking
mechanism. We explain how this rate limit is enforced in
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the first-hand reputation description below. We evaluate
our defenses against poll flood strategies in Section 7.3.
The vote flood adversary is hamstrung by the fact that
votes can be supplied only in response to an invitation
by the putative victim poller, and pollers solicit votes at
a fixed rate. Unsolicited votes are ignored.
First-hand reputation: A peer locally maintains and
uses first-hand reputation (i.e., history) for other peers.
Each peer P maintains a known-peers list, separately for
each AU it preserves. The list contains an entry for ev-
ery peer that P has encountered in the past, tracking its
exchange of votes with that peer. The entry holds a rep-
utation grade for the peer, which is one of three values:
debt, even, or credit. A debt grade means that the peer
has supplied P with fewer votes than P has supplied it.
A credit grade means P has supplied the peer with fewer
votes than the peer has supplied P . An even grade means
that P and the peer are even in their recent exchanges of
votes. Entries in the known-peers list “decay” with time
toward the debt grade.
In a protocol interaction, both the poller and a voter
modify the grade they have assigned to each other de-
pending on their respective behaviors. If the voter sup-
plies a valid vote and valid repairs for any blocks the
poller requests, then the poller increases the grade it has
assigned to the voter (from debt to even, from even to
credit, or from credit to credit) and the voter correspond-
ingly decreases the grade it has assigned to the poller. If
either the poller or the voter misbehave (e.g., the voter
commits to supplying a vote but does not, or the poller
does not send a valid evaluation receipt), then the other
peer decreases its grade to debt. This is similar to the re-
ciprocative strategy of Feldman et al. [17], in that it pe-
nalizes peers who do not reciprocate, i.e., do not supply
votes in return for the votes they receive.
Peers randomly drop some poll invitations arriving
from previously unknown peers and from pollers with
a debt grade. Invitations from pollers with an even or
credit grade are not dropped. This reputation system re-
duces free-riding, as it is not possible for a peer to main-
tain an even or credit grade without providing valid votes.
To discourage identity whitewashing the drop probabil-
ity imposed on unknown pollers is higher than that im-
posed on known in-debt pollers. Furthermore, invitations
from unknown or in-debt pollers are subject to a rigid
rate limit; after it admits one such invitation for consid-
eration, a voter enters a refractory period during which
it automatically rejects all invitations from unknown or
in-debt pollers. Like the known-peers list, refractory pe-
riods are maintained on a per AU basis. Consequently,
during every refractory period, a voter admits at most one
invitation from unknown or in-debt peers, plus at most
one invitation from each of its fellow peers with a credit
or even grade. Since credit and even grades decay with
time, the total “liability” of a peer in the number of in-
vitations it must admit per refractory period is limited
to a small constant number. As a result, the duration of
the refractory period is inversely proportional to the rate
limit imposed by the peer on the poll invitations that it
considers for each AU it preserves.
Continuous triggering of the refractory period can stop
a victim voter from accepting invitations from unknown
peers who are loyal; this can limit the choices a poller
has in potential voters to peers that know the poller al-
ready. To reduce this impediment to diversity, we in-
stitute the concept of peer introductions. A peer may
introduce peers that it considers loyal to others; peers
introduced in this way can bypass random drops and re-
fractory periods. Introductions are bundled along with
nominations during the regular discovery process (Sec-
tion 4.2). Specifically, a poller randomly partitions the
peer identities in a Vote message into outer circle nomi-
nations and introductions. A poll invitation from an in-
troduced peer is treated as if coming from a known peer
with an even grade. This unobstructed admission con-
sumes the introduction in such a way that at most one in-
troduction is honored per (validly voting) introducer, and
unused introductions do not accumulate. Specifically,
when consuming the introduction of peer B by peer A
for AU X , all other introductions of other introducees
by peer A for AU X are “forgotten,” as are all introduc-
tions of peer B for X by other introducers. Furthermore,
introductions by peers who have entered and left the ref-
erence list are also removed, and the maximum number
of outstanding introductions is capped.
Effort Balancing: If a peer expends more effort to re-
act to a protocol message than the sender of that message
did to generate and transmit it, then an attrition attack
need consist only of a flow of ostensibly valid protocol
messages, enough to exhaust the victim peer’s resources.
We adapt the ideas of pricing via processing [15] to
discourage such attacks from resource-constrained ad-
versaries by effort balancing our protocol. We inflate the
cost of a request by requiring it to include a proof of com-
putational effort sufficient to ensure that the total cost of
generating the request exceeds the cost to the supplier
of both verifying the effort proof and satisfying the re-
quest. We favor Memory-Bound Functions (MBF) [14]
rather than CPU-bound schemes such as “client puz-
zles” [12] for this purpose, because the spread in memory
system performance is smaller than that of CPU perfor-
mance [13]. Note that an adversary with ample compu-
tational resources is not hindered by effort balancing.
Applying an effort balancing filter at each step of a
multi-step protocol defends against three attack patterns:
first, desertion strategies in which the attacker stops tak-
ing part some way through the protocol, having spent
less effort in the process than the effort inflicted upon
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his victim; second, reservation strategies that cause the
victim to schedule or commit resources that the attacker
does not use, but successfully take away from other, use-
ful tasks; and, third, wasteful strategies in which service
is obtained but the result is not “consumed” by the re-
quester as expected by the protocol, in an attempt to min-
imize the attacker’s total expended effort.
Pollers could mount a desertion attack by cheaply so-
liciting an expensive vote. To discourage this, the poller
must include provable effort in its vote solicitation mes-
sages (Poll and PollProof) that in total exceeds, by at least
an amount described in the next paragraph, the effort re-
quired by the voter to verify that effort and to produce
the requested vote. Producing a vote amounts to fetching
an AU replica from disk, hashing it, and shipping back
to the poller one hash per block in the Vote message.
Voters could mount a desertion attack by cheaply gen-
erating a bogus vote in response to an expensive solici-
tation, returning garbage instead of block hashes in the
hope of wasting not merely the poller’s solicitation effort
but also its effort to verify the hashes. Because the poller
evaluates the vote one block at a time, it costs the ef-
fort of hashing one block to detect that the vote disagrees
with its own AU replica, which may mean either that the
vote is bogus, or that the poller’s and voter’s replicas of
the AU differ in that block. The voter must therefore
include in the Vote message provable effort sufficient to
cover the cost of hashing a single block and of verifying
this effort. The extra effort in the solicitation messages
referred to above is required to cover the generation of
this provable effort.
Pollers could mount a reservation attack by sending a
valid Poll message that causes the voter to reserve time
for computing a vote in anticipation of a PollProof mes-
sage which the poller never sends. To discourage this,
pollers must include sufficient introductory effort in Poll
messages to match the effort the voter could expend
while waiting for the poller’s PollProof before timing out.
Upon receiving the affirmative PollAck, the poller per-
forms the balance of the provable effort the voter needs
to defend against desertion attacks. The poller includes
the resulting proof in the PollProof message.
Pollers could mount a wasteful attack by soliciting ex-
pensive votes and then discarding them unevaluated. To
discourage this we require the poller, after evaluating a
vote, to supply the voter with an unforgeable evaluation
receipt proving that it evaluated the vote. Voters generate
votes and pollers evaluate them using very similar pro-
cesses: generating or validating effort proofs and hashing
blocks of the local AU replica. Conveniently, generating
a proof of effort using our chosen MBF mechanism also
generates 160 bits of unforgeable byproduct. The voter
remembers the byproduct; the poller uses it as the evalua-
tion receipt to send to the voter. If the receipt matches the
voter’s remembered byproduct the voter knows the poller
performed the necessary effort, regardless of whether the
poller was loyal or malicious.
In Section 7.4 we show how our series of effort balanc-
ing filters fare against such attacks mounted by pollers,
evaluating the success of an adversary who defects at dif-
ferent key points in the protocol, seeking to maximize the
defenders’ wasted effort. We omit the evaluation of ef-
fort balancing attacks by voters, since they are rendered
ineffective by the rate limits described above.
5.2 Desynchronization
The desynchronization defense requires that measures
such as randomization be applied to avoid the kind of
inadvertent synchronization that has been observed in
many distributed systems. Examples include TCP sender
windows at bottleneck routers, clients waiting for a busy
server, and periodic routing messages [18]. Peer-to-peer
systems in which a peer requesting service must find
many others simultaneously available to supply that ser-
vice (e.g., in a read-one-write-many fault-tolerant sys-
tem [27]) may encounter this problem. If they do, even
absent an attack, moderate levels of peer busyness can
prevent the system from delivering services. A poll flood
attacker in this situation may only need to increase peer
busyness slightly to have a large effect.
Simulations of poll flood attacks on an earlier version
of the protocol [28] showed this effect. Loyal pollers
were at a great disadvantage against the attrition adver-
sary because they needed to find a quorum of voters who
could simultaneously vote on an AU. The voters must
be chosen at random to make directed subversion hard
for the adversary. They must also have free resources
at the specified time, in the face of resource contention
from other peers who are also competing for voters on
the same or other AUs at the same time. The adversary
has no such requirements; he can find and invite an indi-
vidual victim into a futile poll.
Peers avoid this problem by soliciting votes individu-
ally rather than synchronously, extending the period dur-
ing which a quorum of votes can be collected before they
are all evaluated. A poll is thus a sequence of two-party
interactions rather than a single multi-party interaction.
5.3 Redundancy
If the survival of, or access to, an AU relied only on a few
replicas, an attrition attack could focus on those replicas,
cutting off the communication between them needed for
audit and repair. Each LOCKSS peer preserving an AU
maintains its own replica and serves it only to its local
clients. This massive redundancy helps resist attacks in
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two ways. First, it ensures that a successful attrition at-
tack must target most of the replicas, typically a large
number of peers. Second, it forces the attrition attack to
suppress the communication or activity of the targeted
peers continuously for a long period. Unless the attack
does both, the targeted peers recover by auditing and re-
pairing themselves from the untargeted peers, as shown
in Section 7.2. This is because massive redundancy al-
lows peers at each poll to choose a sample of their ref-
erence list that is bigger than the quorum and continue
to solicit votes from them at random times for the entire
duration of a poll (typically 3 months) until the voters ac-
cept. Further, the margin between the rate at which peers
call polls and the rate at which they suffer undetected
damage provides redundancy in time. A single failed poll
has little effect on the safety of its caller’s replica.
6 Simulation
In this section we give details about the simulation envi-
ronment and the metrics we use to evaluate the system’s
effectiveness in meeting its goals.
The first requirement for the system is to preserve the
long-term integrity of the replicated AU, by ensuring that
a majority of all replicas reflect the correct AU contents.
If a majority of replicas are corrupt, we consider the sys-
tem to have failed with irrecoverable damage.
An attrition adversary could in theory mount a pipe
stoppage attack of sufficient coverage, intensity, and du-
ration to prevent all communication between all replicas
for long enough for undetected storage errors to corrupt a
majority of replicas. In practice this attack would have to
last for years; other non-attrition attacks aimed more di-
rectly at corrupting data are more likely to make progress
at these timescales [29].
The second requirement for the system is to preserve
access to a correct replica at each peer for as much of the
time as possible, in the face of local storage failures and
attacks. Reducing the probability that a particular correct
replica is accessible is a more attainable goal for an attri-
tion attack than causing irrecoverable damage through an
attrition attack, thus our simulations measure the success
of the adversary against this goal.
6.1 Evaluation Metrics
We use four metrics to measure the effectiveness of our
defenses against the attrition adversary: access failure
probability, delay ratio, coefficient of friction, and cost
ratio.
Access failure probability: To measure the success of
an attrition adversary at increasing the probability that a
reader obtains a damaged AU replica, we compute the
access failure probability as the fraction of all replicas
in the system that are damaged, averaged over all time
points in the experiment.
Delay ratio: To measure the degradation an attrition
adversary achieves, we compute the delay ratio as the
mean time between successful polls at loyal peers with
the system under attack divided by the same measure-
ment without the attack.
Coefficient of friction: To measure the cost of an attack
to loyal peers, we measure the coefficient of friction, de-
fined as the average effort expended by loyal peers per
successful poll during an attack divided by their average
per-poll effort absent an attack.
Cost ratio: To compare the cost of an effortful attack
to the adversary and to the defenders, we compute the
cost ratio, which is the ratio of the total effort expended
by the attackers during an attack to that of the defenders.
6.2 Environment and Adversaries
We run our experiments using Narses [19], a discrete-
event simulator that exports a sockets-like network inter-
face and provides facilities for modeling computationally
expensive operations, such as computing MBF efforts
and hashing documents. Narses allows experimenters
to pick from a range of network models that trade off
speed for accuracy. In this study we are mostly interested
in the application-level effects of an attrition attack, so
we choose a simplistic network model that takes into ac-
count network delays but not congestion, except for the
side-effects of artificial congestion used by a pipe stop-
page adversary. The link bandwidths with which peers
connect to the network are uniformly distributed among
three choices: 1.5, 10, and 100 Mbps. Link latencies are
uniformly distributed between 1 and 30 milliseconds.
Nodes in the system are divided into two categories:
loyal peers and the adversary’s minions. Loyal peers are
uncompromised peers that execute the protocol correctly.
Adversary minions are nodes that collaborate to execute
the adversary’s attack strategy.
We conservatively simulate the adversary as a cluster
of nodes with as many IP addresses and as much compute
power as he needs. Each adversary minion has complete
and instantaneous knowledge of all adversary state and
has a magically incorruptible copy of all AUs. Other as-
sumptions about our adversary that are less relevant to
attrition can be found in [29].
To distill the adversary’s actual cost of attack from any
other effort he might have to shoulder (e.g., to masquer-
ade as a loyal peer), the adversary in these experiments is
completely outside of the network of loyal peers. Loyal
peers never ask the adversary’s minions to vote in polls
and the adversary only asks loyal peers to vote in his
polls. This differs from LOCKSS adversaries we have
studied before [29].
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6.3 Simulation Parameters
We evaluate the preservation of a collection of AUs dis-
tributed among a population of loyal peers. For simplic-
ity in this stage of our exploration, we assume that each
AU contains 0.5 GBytes (a large AU in practice). Each
peer maintains a number of AUs ranging from 50 to 600.
All peers have replicas of all AUs; we do not yet simu-
late the diversity of local collections that we expect will
evolve over time. These simplifications allow us to fo-
cus our attention on the common performance of our at-
trition resistance machinery, ignoring for the time being
how that performance varies when AUs vary in size and
popularity. Note that our 600 simulated AUs total about
10% of the size of the annual AU intake of a large journal
collection such as that of Stanford University Libraries.
Adding the equivalent of 10 of today’s low-cost PCs per
year and consolidating them as old PCs are rendered ob-
solete is an affordable deployment scenario for a large
library. We set all costs of primitive operations (hashing,
encryption, L1 cache and RAM accesses, etc.) to match
the capabilities of such a low-cost PC.
All simulations have a constant loyal peer population
of 100 nodes and run for two simulated years, with 3
runs per data point. Each peer runs a poll on each of
its AUs on average every 3 months. Each poll uses a
quorum of 10 peers and considers landslide agreement
as having a maximum of three disagreeing votes. These
parameters were empirically determined from previous
iterations of the deployed beta protocol. We set the fixed
drop probability to be 0.90 for unknown peers and 0.80
for in-debt peers.
Memory limits in the Java Virtual Machine prevent
Narses from simulating more than about 50 AUs/peer in
a single run. We simulate 600 AU collections by layering
50 AUs/peer runs, adding the tasks caused by this layer’s
50 AUs to the task schedule for each peer accumulated
during the preceding layers. In effect, layer n is a simula-
tion of 50 AUs on peers already running a realistic work-
load of 50(n − 1) AUs. The effect is to over-estimate
the peer’s busyness for AUs in higher layers and under-
estimate it for AUs in lower layers; AUs in a layer com-
pete for the resources left over by lower layers but AUs
in lower layers are unaffected by the resources used in
higher layers. We have validated this technique against
unlayered simulations in smaller collections, as well as
against simulations in which inflated per-AU preserva-
tion costs cause similar levels of peer load; we found
negligible differences.
We are currently exploring the parameter space but
use the following heuristics to help determine parame-
ter values. The refractory period of one day allows for
90 invitations from unknown or in-debt peers to be ac-
cepted per 3-month inter-poll interval; in contrast, a peer
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Figure 2: Mean access failure probability (y axis in log
scale) for increasing inter-poll intervals (x axis) at vari-
able mean times between storage failure (from 1 to 5
years per disk), absent an attack. We show results for
collection sizes of 50 (points only) and of 600 AUs (line-
spoints). For illustration, we show minimum and maxi-
mum values for the 2-year data set; this variance is repre-
sentative of all measurements, which we omit for clarity.
requires an average of 30 votes per poll and, because of
self-clocking, should be able to accept at least an aver-
age of 30 poll invitations per inter-poll interval. Conse-
quently, we allow up to a total of four times the rate of
poll invitations that should be expected in the absence of
attacks. At this rate, even if all poll invitations are bogus,
the total cost of detecting them as bogus is negligible.
We set the fixed drop probability for in-debt peers and
the cost of verifying an introductory effort so that the
cumulative introductory effort expended by an effortful
attack on dropped invitations is more than the voter’s ef-
fort to consider the adversary’s eventually admitted invi-
tation. Since an adversary has to try with in-debt iden-
tities on average 5 times to be admitted (thanks to the
1 − 0.8 = 0.2 admission probability), we set the intro-
ductory effort to be 20% of the total effort required of a
poller; by the time the adversary has gotten his poll invi-
tation admitted, even if he defects for the rest of the poll,
he has already expended on average 100% of the effort
he would have, had he behaved well in the first place.
7 Results
The probability of access failure summarizes the success
of an attrition attack. We start by establishing a baseline
rate of access failures absent an attack. We then assess
the effectiveness against this baseline of the effortless at-
tacks we consider: network-level flooding attacks on the
bandwidth filter in Section 7.2, and Sybil attacks on the
admission control filter in Section 7.3. Finally, we assess
against this baseline each of the effortful attacks corre-
sponding to each effort verification filter in Section 7.4.
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Figure 3: The access failure probability (y axis in log
scale) observed during repeated pipe stoppage attacks of
varying duration (x axis in log scale), covering between
10 and 100% of the peers.
In each case we show the effect of increasing scales of
attack on the access failure probability, and relevant sup-
porting graphs including the delay ratio, the coefficient
of friction, and for effortful attacks the cost ratio.
Our mechanisms for defending against an attrition
adversary raise the effort required per loyal peer. To
achieve a bound on access failure probabilities, one must
be willing to over-provision the system to accommodate
the extra effort. Over-provisioning the system by a con-
stant factor, we can defend it against application-level at-
trition attacks of unlimited power (Sections 7.3 and 7.4).
7.1 Baseline
Our simulated peers suffer random storage damage at
rates of one block in 1 to 5 disk years (50 AUs per disk).
This is a very high rate of damage, as the LOCKSS beta
test suggests that one such undetected occurrence every
5 machine years would be a gross overestimate; we in-
flate this failure rate to encompass other types of storage
failure, including temporary tampering and human error.
Figure 2 plots the access failure probability versus the
inter-poll interval. It shows that as the inter-poll interval
increases relative to the mean interval between storage
failures, the access failure probability increases because
damage takes longer to detect and repair. The access
failure probability is similar for a 50-AU collection all
the way up to a 600-AU collection (we omit intermediate
collection sizes for clarity).
For comparison purposes in the rest of the experi-
ments, the baseline access failure probability of 4.8 ×
10−4 for a 50-AU collection and of 5.2 × 10−4 for a
600-AU collection correspond to our inter-poll interval
of 3 months and a storage damage rate of one block per
5 disk years.
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Figure 4: The delay ratio (y axis in log scale) imposed
by repeated pipe stoppage attacks of varying duration (x
axis in log scale) and coverage of the population. Absent
an attack, this metric has value 1.
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Figure 5: The coefficient of friction (y axis in log scale)
imposed by pipe stoppage attacks of varying duration (x
axis in log scale) and coverage of the population.
7.2 Targeting the Bandwidth Filter
The “pipe stoppage” adversary models packet flood-
ing or more sophisticated attacks [25]. This adversary
suppresses all communication between some proportion
of the total peer population (its coverage) and other
LOCKSS peers. During a pipe-stoppage attack, local
readers may still access content. Each attack consists
of a period of pipe stoppage, which lasts between 1 and
180 days, followed by a 30-day recuperation period dur-
ing which all communication is restored; this pattern is
repeated for the entire experiment, affecting a different
random subset of the population in each iteration.
Figure 3 plots the access failure probability versus the
attack duration for varying coverage values (10 to 100%).
As expected, the access failure probability increases as
the coverage of the attack increases. At 100% coverage,
we see that the larger 600-AU collection tracks the small
50-AU collection closely, albeit at a slight disadvantage,
due to increased scheduling contention as peers get more
loaded. Even in the extreme case where 100% of the pop-
ulation has no communication for 6 months, access fail-
ures occur with a mean probability of about 2.9 × 10−3
for a 600-AU collection; this is well within tolerable lim-
its for any service that is widely open to the Internet.
Figures 4 and 5 plot the delay ratio and coefficient of
friction, respectively, versus attack duration. We find that
attacks must last at least 60 days to raise the delay ratio
by an order of magnitude. Similarly, the coefficient of
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Figure 6: The access failure probability (y axis in log
scale) for attacks of increasing duration (x axis in log
scale) by the admission control adversary over 10 to
100% of the peer population.
friction during repeated attacks that last less than a few
days each is negligibly greater than 1; for longer attacks,
the coefficient can reach 10.
7.3 Targeting the Admission Control Filter
The admission control adversary aims to reduce the like-
lihood of a victim admitting a loyal poll request by trig-
gering that victim’s refractory period as often as possi-
ble. This adversary sends cheap garbage invitations to
varying fractions of the peer population for varying pe-
riods of time separated by a fixed recuperation period of
30 days. The adversary sends his invitations using poller
addresses that are unknown to the victims. These, when
eventually admitted, cause those victims to enter their re-
fractory periods and drop all subsequent invitations from
unknown and in-debt peers.
Figures 6, 7, and 8 show that these attacks have little
effect on the access failure probability or the delay ra-
tio. The access failure probability is raised to 5.9× 10−4
when the duration of the attack reaches the entire du-
ration of our simulations (2 years) for full population
coverage and a 600-AU collection. At that attack inten-
sity, loyal peers no longer admit poll invitations from
unknown or in-debt loyal peers, unless supported by
an introduction. This causes discovery to operate more
slowly; loyal peers waste a lot of their resources on in-
troductory effort proofs that are summarily rejected by
peers in their refractory period. This wasted effort is ap-
parent in Figure 8, which shows that when the attack is
sustained for long periods of time, it can raise the cost to
loyal peers of every successful poll by 33%.
Note that techniques such as blacklisting, commonly
used to defeat denial-of-service attacks in the context of
email spam, or server selection [17] by which pollers
only invite voters they believe will accept, could signifi-
cantly reduce the friction caused by this attack. However,
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Figure 7: Delay ratio (y axis in log scale) for attacks of
increasing duration (x axis in log scale) by the admission
control adversary over 10 to 100% of the peer population.
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Figure 8: Coefficient of friction (y axis in log scale) for
attacks of increasing duration (x axis in log scale) by the
admission control adversary over 10 to 100% of the peer
population.
we have yet to explore whether these defenses would be
compatible with our goal of also protecting against sub-
version attacks that operate by biasing the opinion poll
sample toward corrupted peers [29].
7.4 Targeting the Effort Verification Filters
To attack filters downstream of admission control, the ad-
versary must get through admission control as fast as al-
lowable. We consider an attack by a “brute force” adver-
sary who continuously sends enough poll invitations with
valid introductory efforts to get past the random drops;
such invitations cannot arrive from credit or even identi-
ties at the steady attack state, because they are more fre-
quent than what is considered legitimate. Since unknown
peers suffer more random drops than peers in debt, the
adversary launches attacks from in-debt addresses. We
conservatively initialize all adversary addresses with a
debt grade at all loyal peers. We also give the adversary
an oracle that allows him to inspect all the loyal peers’
schedules. This spares him the generation of introduc-
tory efforts that would be wasted because of scheduling
conflicts at loyal peers.
Once through admission control, the adversary can de-
fect at any stage of the protocol exchange: after provid-
ing the introductory effort in the Poll message (INTRO)
by never following up with a PollProof, after providing
the remaining effort in the PollProof message (REMAIN-
ING) by never following up with an EvaluationReceipt,
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Defection Coeff. Cost Delay Access
friction ratio ratio failure
INTRO 1.40 1.93 1.11 4.99× 10−4
1.31 2.04 1.10 6.35× 10−4
REMAIN- 2.61 1.55 1.11 5.90× 10−4
ING 2.50 1.60 1.10 6.16× 10−4
NONE 2.60 1.02 1.11 5.58× 10−4
2.49 1.06 1.10 6.19× 10−4
Table 1: The effect of the brute force adversary defect-
ing at various points in the protocol on the coefficient of
friction, the cost ratio, the delay ratio, and the access fail-
ure probability. For each point, the upper numbers cor-
respond to the 50-AU collection and the lower numbers
correspond to the 600-AU collection.
and not defecting at all (NONE).
Table 1 shows that the brute force adversary’s most
cost-effective strategy (i.e., with the lowest cost ratio
metric) is to participate fully in the protocol; by doing
so he is able to raise loyal peers’ preservation cost (i.e.,
their coefficient of friction) by a factor of 2.60 (2.49 for
the large collection). Doing so raises the baseline prob-
ability of access failure to 6.19 × 10−4 at a cost almost
identical to that incurred to the defenders (by a factor
of 1.06). Fortunately, this continuous attack even from
a brute force adversary unconcerned by his own effort
expenditure is unable to increase the access failure prob-
ability of the victims greatly; the rate limits prevent him
from bringing his advantage in resources to bear. Simi-
lar behavior in our earlier work [29] prevented a differ-
ent unconstrained adversary from modifying the content
without detection.
In the analysis above, we conservatively assume that
the brute force adversary uses attacking identities in the
debt grade of their victims. Space constraints lead us to
omit experiments with an adversary whose minions may
be in either even or credit grade. This adversary polls
a victim only after he has supplied that victim with a
vote, then defects in any of the ways described above.
He then recovers his grade at the victim by supplying an
appropriate number of valid votes in succession. Each
vote he supplies is used to introduce new minions that
thereby bypass the victim’s admission control before de-
fecting. This attack requires the victim to invite minions
into polls and is thus rate-limited enough that it is less
effective than brute force. It is also further limited by the
decay of first-hand reputation toward the debt grade. We
leave the details for an extended version of this paper.
8 Related Work
The protocol described here is derived from earlier
work [29] in which we covered the background of
the LOCKSS system. That protocol used redundancy,
rate limitation, effort balancing, bimodal behavior (polls
must be won or lost by a landslide) and friend bias (solic-
iting some percentage of votes from peers on the friends
list) to prevent powerful adversaries from modifying the
content without detection, or discrediting the intrusion
detection system with false alarms. To mitigate its vul-
nerability to attrition, in this work we reinforce these de-
fenses using admission control, desynchronization, and
redundancy, and restructure votes to support a block-
based repair mechanism that penalizes free-riding. In
this section we list work that describes the nature and
types of denial of service attacks, as well as related work
that applies defenses similar to ours.
Our attrition adversary draws on a wide range of work
in detecting [22], measuring [31], and combating [2, 26,
38, 39] network-level DDoS attacks capable of stopping
traffic to and from our peers. This work observes that
current attacks are not simultaneously of high intensity,
long duration, and high coverage (many peers) [31].
Redundancy is a key to survival during some DoS at-
tacks, because pipe stoppage appears to other peers as a
failed peer. Many systems use redundancy to mask stor-
age failure [24]. Byzantine Fault Tolerance [7] is related
to the LOCKSS opinion polling mechanism in its goal
of managing replicas in the face of attack. It provides
stronger guarantees but is not as well adapted to large
numbers of replicas. Routing along multiple redundant
paths in Distributed Hash Tables (DHTs) has been sug-
gested as a way of increasing the probability that a mes-
sage arrives at its intended recipient despite nodes drop-
ping messages due to malice [6] or pipe stoppage [23].
Rate limits are effective in slowing the spread of
viruses [40, 44]. They have also been suggested for lim-
iting the rate at which peers can join a DHT [6, 43] as a
defense against attempts to control part of the hash space.
Our work suggests that DHTs will need to rate limit not
only joins but also stores to defend against attrition at-
tacks. Another study [37] suggests that the increased la-
tency this will cause will not affect users’ behavior.
Effort balancing is used as a defense against spam,
which may be considered an application-level DoS at-
tack and has received the bulk of the attention in this
area. Our effort balancing defense draws on pricing via
processing concepts [15]. We measure cost by memory
cycles [1, 14]; others use CPU cycles [4, 15] or even
Turing tests [41]. Crosby et al. [10] show that worst-
case behavior of application algorithms can be exploited
in application-level DoS attacks; our use of nonces and
the bounded verification time of MBF avoid this risk. In
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the LOCKSS system we avoid strong peer identities and
infrastructure changes, and therefore rule out many tech-
niques for excluding malign peers such as Secure Over-
lay Services [23].
Related to first-hand reputation is the use of game-
theoretic analysis of peer behavior by Feldman et al. [17]
to show that a reciprocative strategy in admission control
policy can motivate cooperation among selfish peers.
Admission control has been used to improve the us-
ability of overloaded services. For example, Cherkasova
et al. [8] propose admission control strategies that help
protect long-running Web service sessions (i.e., related
sequences of requests) from abrupt termination. Pre-
serving the responsiveness of Web services in the face of
demand spikes is critical, whereas LOCKSS peers need
only manage their resources to make progress at the nec-
essary rate in the long term. They can treat demand
spikes as hostile behavior. In a P2P context, Daswani
et al. [11] use admission control (and rate limiting) to
mitigate the effects of a query flood attack against super-
peers in unstructured file-sharing peer-to-peer networks
such as Gnutella.
Golle and Mironov [20] provide compliance enforce-
ment in the context of distributed computation using a
receipt technique similar to ours. Random auditing us-
ing challenges and hashing has been proposed [9, 43] as
a means of enforcing trading requirements in some dis-
tributed storage systems.
In DHTs waves of synchronized routing updates
caused by joins or departures cause instability during pe-
riods of high churn. Bamboo’s [33] desynchronization
defense using lazy updates is effective.
9 Future Work
We are currently exploring the admission control param-
eter space. In particular, we are studying the effects of
varying the length of the refractory period, the drop prob-
abilities for unknown and in-debt peers, and the effects of
running the audit protocol over a larger number of AUs.
As the number of AUs increases and peers are naturally
more busy participating in polls, a longer refractory pe-
riod may be more appropriate to allow loyal peers time
to handle the load of polls called by other loyal peers.
We have three immediate goals for future work. First,
we observe that although the protocol is symmetric, the
attrition adversary’s use of it is asymmetric. It may be
that adaptive behavior of the loyal peers can exploit this
asymmetry. For example, loyal peers could modulate the
probability of acceptance of a poll request according to
their recent busyness. The effect would be to raise the
marginal effort required to increase the loyal peer’s busy-
ness as the attack effort increases. Second, we need to
understand how our defenses against attrition work in a
more dynamic environment, where new loyal peers con-
tinually join the system over time. Third, we need to con-
sider combined adversary strategies; it could be that the
adversary can use an attrition attack to weaken the sys-
tem in some way that leaves it more vulnerable to other
attack goals.
10 Conclusion
The defenses of this paper equip the LOCKSS system to
resist attrition well:
• Application-level attrition attacks, even from adver-
saries with no resource constraints and sustained for
two years, can be defeated with a constant factor of
over-provisioning. Such over-provisioning is natu-
ral in our application, but further work may signifi-
cantly reduce the required amount.
• The strategy that provides an unconstrained adver-
sary with the greatest impact on the system is to be-
have as a large number of new loyal peers.
• Network-level attacks do not affect the system sig-
nificantly unless they are (a) intense enough to stop
all communication between peers, (b) widespread
enough to target all of the peers, and (c) sustained
over a significant fraction of an inter-poll interval.
Digital preservation is an unusual application, in that
the goal is to prevent things from happening. The
LOCKSS system resists failures and attacks from pow-
erful adversaries without normal defenses such as long-
term secrets and central administration. The techniques
that we have developed may be primarily applicable to
preservation, but we hope that our conservative design
will assist others in building systems that better meet so-
ciety’s need for more reliable and defensible systems.
Both the LOCKSS project and the Narses simulator
are hosted at SourceForge, and both carry BSD-style
Open Source licenses. Implementation of this protocol
in the production LOCKSS system is in progress.
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